Social Work and Pornography:Some Ethical Considerations by Smith, Mark & Cree, Viviene
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social Work and Pornography
Citation for published version:
Smith, M & Cree, V 2014, 'Social Work and Pornography: Some Ethical Considerations' Ethics and Social
Welfare, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 317-331. DOI: 10.1080/17496535.2014.889735
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1080/17496535.2014.889735
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Ethics and Social Welfare
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Smith, M., & Cree, V. (2014). Social Work and Pornography: Some Ethical Considerations. Ethics and Social
Welfare.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
1 
 
 
 
Social Work and Pornography: Some 
Ethical Considerations 
 
To cite this article: Mark Smith & Viviene E. Cree (2014): Social Work and 
Pornography: Some 
Ethical Considerations, Ethics and Social Welfare, DOI: 
10.1080/17496535.2014.889735 
 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17496535.2014.889735 
 
Introduction 
 
In the UK, recent high-profile cases where men convicted of murder were 
found to have viewed either child or extreme pornography have brought the 
subject into the spotlight, prompting high profile political and activist 
campaigns calling for restrictions to be placed on access to online 
pornography. Opening up discussion of this subject within social work 
becomes important, as social workers are increasingly called upon to become 
involved in providing court reports or undertaking risk assessments in respect 
of those whose pornography use brings them to the attention of criminal or 
civil authorities. A brief survey of the literature on social work and 
pornography points to the influence of particular feminist perspectives (e.g. 
Mullender, 2002). Another strand reveals a clinical orientation and a tendency 
to relate pornography to risk and harm (e.g. Calder, 2004). Both of these 
positions identify pornography as something reprehensible and act to close 
down discussion. We argue here following Cornell (2000) that the parameters 
of debates about pornography need to be expanded. Specifically the subject 
requires to be explored in the light of ethical frameworks and principles.  
 
This article offers a preliminary exploration of an ethics of pornography (given 
its ubiquity, the focus is primarily on internet pornography). It was prompted, 
initially, by an encounter one of us had whilst teaching ethics to social work 
students, where discussion of the rights and wrongs of pornography elicited 
contributions ranging from it being ‘wrong’ because it was illegal, to feminist 
concerns that it objectified women, to it being  ‘a right’ in pursuit of a healthy 
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sex life. The article attempts to tease out these positions. Several questions 
frame our approach: what are we talking about? How should pornography be 
understood from an ethical perspective? For example, does it do harm, either 
directly, or indirectly by objectifying women? Alternatively, can and should it 
be considered a right? What is and should be social work’s role in relation to 
pornography? We conclude that while one may have moral reservations 
regarding pornography, a classical liberal presumption against restrictions on 
free expression ought to be the baseline upon which further discussion might 
proceed. 
 
What are we talking about? 
 
Cornell notes that pornography can be defined so broadly as to include ‘all 
sexually explicit material, whether written or visual, no matter how it was 
produced and for what purpose’ (2000: 2). By such a standard, a sex 
education text might be considered a form of pornography. In fact, it is almost 
impossible to separate out the subject of pornography from how we feel about 
it; it can variously be described as ‘erotica’ on the one hand and ‘sexual 
abuse’ on the other.  It is also socially and culturally context-specific; works of 
art that depict the nude form may be viewed as acceptable whereas 
depictions of women’s breasts on page 3 of the Sun newspaper or in so-
called ‘lads’ mags’ may not. There is, moreover, a huge variation within 
pornography, from what might be regarded by most observers as mildly 
titillating to images of extreme, violent or (what might be considered to be) 
unusual sexual expression; finding a catch-all definition that social work can 
make use of is, as a result, fundamentally problematic. Definitional difficulties 
notwithstanding, there is no doubt that pornography is widely available and 
used.  
 
Incidence and prevalence of pornography 
Hacking (1992) asserts that for a problem to be studied, it ought to be 
amenable to questions of incidence and prevalence.  Pornography is quite 
evidently prevalent:  
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Whatever else it is, pornography is big business. With around 420 million 
webpages devoted to X-rated content, 700 million DVD rentals, and 
more than 13,000 hardcore films released each year, the worldwide 
annual revenue of the porn industry has been estimated at 97 billion 
dollars. People spend more on pornography every year than they do on 
movie tickets and more than they do on all the performing arts 
combined’ (Maes and Levinson, 2012: 1).  
 
Sums of money spent on pornography do not begin to take into account 
access what is freely available on the internet.  Figures suggest that over 30% 
of internet traffic is pornography related; more of the internet is taken up with 
porn than with Google and e-mail combined (Digital Journal, 2012). Much of 
what is freely available on the internet reflects changing online technology 
with the evolution of Web 2.0, which has led to an explosion in social media 
and self-generated content. One expression of this has been a massive 
growth of ‘home-made’, ‘amateur’ or ‘reality porn’ and of ‘sexting’, where 
people post online images or videos of themselves and their partners 
engaged in sexual acts. The sheer scale and the seemingly voluntary nature 
of such developments assume a particular relevance in this discussion in that 
many of the arguments against the use of pornography operate on the basis 
that it is a minority interest, at odds with mainstream (respectable) opinion. 
The facts and the figures would suggest otherwise. Moreover, acceptance of 
adult pornography is widespread across societies (Diamond, 2010), perhaps 
reflecting a generational aspect. A study with a sample of 813, 18 to 26 year 
old U.S. college students (Carrol et al, 2009) revealed that roughly two thirds 
(67%) of young men and one half (49%) of young women agreed that viewing 
pornography is acceptable, whereas nearly 9 out of 10 (87%) young men and 
nearly one third (31%) of young women reported using pornography.  
 
These figures, presumably, relate to adult pornography and while one may 
find this distasteful, it is not illegal. Child pornography takes us into a very 
different arena. Some things, according to Hacking (1991), are indisputably 
evil; there is no defense that might be imagined for instances of young 
children being abused for adult sexual gratification and Jenkins (2001) 
cautions that such crime is indeed real and highly organised. The trouble is, 
that the taboo surrounding the subject means that most of us have little idea 
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of what is being spoken about when we hear talk of ‘child pornography’ and 
our thoughts are drawn towards some of the more lurid examples that we 
hear of in the media. In fact, prosecutions for possession of child pornography 
involve a range of images from ‘everyday and perhaps accidental pictures 
involving either no overt erotic content, or minimal content (such as showing a 
child’s underwear) at one extreme, to pictures showing actual rape and 
penetration of a child, or other gross acts of obscenity at the other’ (Quayle, 
2009: 6). Besides, the fact that the international definition of a child is anyone 
under the age of 18 would suggest that viewing self-generated images of a 
sexually and intellectually mature 17-year-old could be seen as deviant ‘in the 
same way as viewing a 3-year-old child who is tied up and being hurt’ (2009: 
8). It is hard to argue any moral equivalence between the two, but, Hacking 
argues that, in a climate of anxiety over children and sex, they become 
lumped together ‘under one unreflective but powerful emblem’ in this case, 
“child pornography”, which merely serves ‘mindlessly to identify the evil 
enemy in our midst’ (1991: 286/285). The reality is that much pornography 
operates in this messy borderland, which makes clear-cut distinctions 
between what is legal or illegal, right or wrong, difficult (Adler, 2008). This 
takes us to discussion of how we might understand pornography ethically. 
 
 
Ethical considerations: the liberal position 
 
Historically, a right to view pornography has been linked with a classical 
liberal position deriving from the work of J.S. Mill and guaranteeing freedom of 
expression. Mill presumed against the state‘s legitimacy ‘to prescribe opinions 
to (people), and determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be 
allowed to hear’ (1859). A similar right to freedom of speech and expression is 
enshrined in the First Amendment to the American Constitution and 
subsequently in much human rights legislation. Clark (2000) argues that the 
predominant value base of the western developed world and, indeed, of social 
work, derives from such classic liberal precepts. He identifies self-
determination as expressing a fundamental freedom – that individuals have 
the ability and moral right to make their own decision about the course of their 
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lives, what might be termed ‘agency’. Conversely, preventing them from 
making and enacting choices is considered morally undesirable (Clark, 2000).  
 
The philosopher Ronald Dworkin (1981) applies a liberal position to questions 
of pornography, arguing that people may have rights to what others might 
consider wrong. The consequences, he claims, of trying to censor or 
otherwise suppress pornography strike at the heart of liberal democracy; 
people ought to be free to do the wrong thing, so long as there is no harm 
involved. Under human rights law they ought to be able to do so in privacy 
without undue state intrusion. The liberal position hinges around presumptions 
of autonomy and consent; individuals, unless there is good reason to 
conclude otherwise on the grounds of coercion, immaturity or mental decline, 
are presumed to have the capacity to enter freely into social exchanges. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties and ambiguities of defining a child, as touched 
on above, this makes decisions on child sexual abuse straightforward.  
 
Such decisions are more nuanced in respect of adults.  Consent assumes 
free exchange, while in reality a number of structural factors can militate 
against this. It may be argued that some women are forced into pornography 
through economic necessity. Such cases could legitimately be subject to a 
Marxist critique of commodification and exploitation. Furthermore, some 
feminists argue that the patriarchal basis of society by its very nature 
commodifies and exploits women and that pornography is an expression of 
this. A Kantian corollary to Marxist objections might posit that those who 
appear in pornography are used by those who view such material merely as 
means to the end of the viewer’s sexual arousal, a position that is not morally 
justifiable. We will return to this but, stay with  the liberal position for the time 
being, Mill (1859) argued that: ‘[T]he only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his 
(sic) will, is to prevent harm to others’. Subsequent legal developments have 
sought to include obscenity alongside harm as justifying the curtailment of 
free expression. We consider each justification for censorship in turn. 
 
Pornography and harm 
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As noted above, a liberal position posits that the only justification for curtailing 
free expression is that of harm. Pornography can be argued to be harmful in 
two main ways: the first pragmatic and the second ideological. 
 
The first argument and the one being foregrounded in current political 
campaigns to restrict the availability of pornography is based on what might 
be thought of as a commonsense assumption that pornography leads to 
subsequent violent sexual acts, an assumption encapsulated in the feminist 
dictum ‘pornography is the theory - rape is the practice’ (Morgan, 1977: 169). 
There is, in fact, scant evidence of a clear ‘cause and effect’ relationship 
between viewing pornography and contact sexual offending (Feder-Kittay, 
1988;, Diamond, 2010). Kutchinsky’s (1991) study of four countries that 
liberalised pornography showed that there was no increase in rape statistics 
in any of them. Similarly, McElroy (1997) points out that in Japan, where 
pornography depicting graphic and brutal violence is widely accessible, rape 
is considerably lower per capita than in the U.S., where such porn is 
restricted. More recently, Cooke (2012) argues that there still is no adequate 
evidence to support any causal link and that the relevant causal mechanism 
has yet to be discovered. In fact, ‘soft-core’ pornography has been found to be 
‘negatively associated with the likelihood of rape and actual rape behaviour’ 
(Duschinsky 2012: 70). Diamond (2010) goes further and suggests, in a 
review of the evidence, that there is an inverse relationship between the 
availability of pornography and contact sex crimes across the board.  
 
Just as it is difficult to support any direct link between pornography and 
subsequent contact crime, there is also ‘surprisingly little data’ to support the 
idea that watching pornography involving children actually leads to their 
sexual abuse (Quayle, 2009: 9). Howitt and Sheldon (2007) and Quayle 
(2009) question any simple link between fantasy and action in such cases. In 
fact, U.S. figures indicate strong emerging evidence of a dramatic reduction in 
contact sex crime against children at the same time that we are led to believe 
that there is an explosion of online child pornography (Finkelhor and Jones, 
2012). More generally, if watching pornography did lead to the acting out of 
fantasies then, given the scale of its use, we would indeed be facing an 
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epidemic of sexual crimes across society. We are not. Crimes of sex and 
violence, in fact, show a steady decline in recent years (Office for National 
Statistics, 2012).  
 
There is a caveat to be aware of. Malamuth, argues that while ‘Exposure to 
pornography does not have negative effects on attitudes supporting violence 
against women … for the majority of men’, violent pornography ‘does have a 
negative effect on an important sub-set of men, namely those who have other 
risk factors for committing sexual aggression.’ (Analysis 24 June 2013) see 
also Malamuth et al, 2000). Seto et al (2001) make a similar point, arguing 
that individuals who are predisposed to sexually offend are more likely to 
show an effect of pornography exposure. This is an important distinction, 
suggesting that those with pre-existing tendencies towards violent sexual acts 
might seek out aggressive pornography to rehearse their fantasies, rather 
than pornography causing these desires in the first place. Such offenders 
might also find it convenient to identify the internet as an explanation/excuse 
for their own behavior; it is after all, a very familiar ‘cultural cliché’ at present 
(Brown 2000).  
 
There is another way in which pornography, especially internet pornography, 
might be argued to be harmful. Proponents of a harm discourse might point to 
the potential for adverse future consequences for those taking part in 
pornographic scenes should images remain available online into the future, 
raising the prospect that any initial violation or act of youthful folly continues to 
be revisited upon those engaged in pornographic activity. This shifts the focus 
of concern away from actual or probabilistic risk into the realm of possibilistic 
risk (Furedi, 2009). It is, however, impossible to know the likely future 
consequences of actions taken in sound mind in the present and seeking to 
proscribe these on the basis of a future unknown denies agency and might be 
considered unjustified paternalism.  
 
Pornography as harmful to women 
The ideological objection to pornography relates to its assumed harm to 
women as a group, reflecting what has become the currently ascendant 
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feminist perspective. This position has its roots in the radical or ‘second wave’ 
feminism associated with Canadian Law Professor Catherine MacKinnon and 
American activist Andrea Dworkin. This literature takes a binary position, 
identifying women as the objects of pornography and men its consumers. 
Radical feminists argue that pornography is degrading, and that in and of 
itself, it is an act of sexual violence (McElroy, 1997). Dworkin argues that the 
term ‘sex industry’ is simply a ‘euphemism for the sexual enslavement of 
women’ (2004: 138). From this perspective, women cannot be said to properly 
consent to participate in the sex industry and that any such consent is merely 
the product of ‘false consciousness’ and illustrative of an oppressive 
patriarchal society.  Mackinnon explains further: 
‘Pornography, in the feminist view, is a form of forced sex, a practice of 
sexual politics, an institution of gender inequality. In this perspective, 
pornography is not harmless fantasy or a corrupt and confused 
misrepresentation of an otherwise natural and healthy sexuality. Along 
with the rape and prostitution in which it participates, pornography 
institutionalizes male supremacy, which fuses the eroticization of 
dominance and submission with the social construction of male and 
female’ (2000: 171). 
 
Nussbaum (2004) credits Mackinnon and Dworkin with shifting the debate on 
pornography away from obscenity and towards foregrounding its exploitative 
consequences for women. This view has gained a particular dominance in 
current debates, to the point that it can be assumed to be ‘the’ feminist 
position. 
 
There is, however, a range of feminist perspectives around pornography. 
Liberal and postmodern perspectives question whether pornography is 
necessarily exploitative or harmful to women. Feder Kittay (1988) suggests 
that pornography offers a medium ‘to explode the sexually conventional’ and 
as such, holds out transformative possibilities in respect of female sexuality. 
These possibilities, she argues, ‘must be protected by feminists and all who 
aim for a progressive vision’ (1988: 130). Another high profile feminist, Judith 
Butler, questions the prosecution of pornography offences, arguing that 
9 
 
 
 
increased censorship does little to further the battle to stop violence against 
women; instead it ‘criminalizes many individuals who wish to view such 
material but do not cause harm to others’ (1997: 69). From this perspective, 
positions that construct pornography as necessarily harmful to women merely 
serve to maintain and perpetuate ‘moralistic and stereotypical constructions of 
female sexuality and female desire’ (Carline, 2011: 320).  
 
Furthermore, the scale and variety of material available challenges 
assumptions of pornography as perpetuating a particular stylised image of 
women. If nothing else, the internet confronts us with the fact that human 
sexuality is diverse. Indeed, it might be argued that the internet has 
democratised sexuality, catering for every hue, shape and size of sexual 
preference and predilection, including a large market in gay and lesbian 
pornography. Moreover, the scale of self-generated pornography 
fundamentally changes the complexion of earlier debates, challenging default 
assumptions of harm and exploitation, either individually or to women as a 
group and locates the subject within the sphere of sexual self-expression. As 
such, it renders Kantian concerns about ends and means problematic; if those 
posting images of themselves do so with free will and, possibly, for some 
sexual motivation of their own, then just who is using whom becomes 
something of a moot point. Passonen argues that the internet, in this respect, 
has ‘blurred the boundaries’ between producers and consumers of porn, and 
led to a challenging of the familiar debates around pornography, sexism and 
abuse (2010: 1297). She concludes:  
‘Rather than simulations of desire or repetition of old porn conventions, 
netporn is read as an expression of people’s preferences and kinks: 
rather than exploitative consumers, users are seen to hook into this 
economy of desires as the audience desired by the performers and 
producers’ (2010: 1308). 
 
Pornography as obscenity 
The inclusion of obscenity as a justification for curtailing what might be 
thought to be liberal freedoms of expression derives from Lord Devlin’s ‘The 
Enforcement of Morals’ (1958), described by Nussbaum as ‘an influential work 
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of conservative political thought’ (2004: 4). Devlin’s argument is that a society 
has the right to protect and preserve itself from expressions that a reasonable 
man might find obscene or disgusting, even if it causes no harm. This is ‘the 
man on the Clapham omnibus’ test of public morality (Nussbaum, 2004). The 
problem, of course, is that the views of the man on the Clapham omnibus are 
notoriously subjective. A celebrated case in law led Justice Potter Stewart in 
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1964 to declare in respect of whether material 
presented to him was obscene or not, ‘I know it when I see it’.  The moral 
majority argument also presumes that the man on the Clapham omnibus is 
being truthful about his viewing habits. Given the scale of pornography use 
one might conclude that he may not be.  
 
But, disgust is not just individually subjective; what a society might find 
disgusting at one point in time may, very quickly, be considered mainstream. 
Cole Porter tells us that ‘In olden days a glimpse of stocking was looked on a 
something shocking’. While it may seem fatuous to equate a glimpse of 
stocking with ‘extreme’ pornography, this is exactly the point. Glimpses of 
stocking in the Victorian and Edwardian eras were considered as scandalous 
and as much a threat to social order as pornography is now. D.H. Lawrence’s 
novel, Lady Chatterley’s Lover, was proscribed from its publication in 1928 
until a court case in the 1960s. In 1953 alone, the police seized 30,000 smutty 
seaside postcards (Jones, 2012). Homosexuality was persecuted and 
homosexual men hounded and jailed until relatively recently and the thought 
of homosexual acts elicited moral outrage every bit as visceral as 
pornography does today. Yet, times change and societies across the world 
are now at various stages of legislating for gay marriage. The trouble with 
attempts to legally regulate or proscribe sexual practices is that the law 
invariably ends up playing ‘catch up’ with rapidly shifting sexual mores. The 
result is that it may act repressively and capriciously upon those caught up in 
its ambit and ultimately retreat in ignominy as a new sexual order beds in.  
 
Nussbaum, while sympathetic to MacKinnon and Dworkin’s arguments about 
pornography’s positioning of women and to prohibition on this basis, 
nevertheless, makes a spirited case that disgust should not compromise 
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fundamental freedoms nor should it provide a justification in law, however 
distasteful we may find particular behaviours. It is, she argues, ‘an utter red 
herring in the law of pornography’ (2004: 75). But the problem with using 
disgust as a justification to attack pornography goes deeper than 
philosophical objection. Much of what is played out in the public sphere in 
relation pornography reflects deep-seated societal and psychic conflicts about 
sex. Pornography, especially perhaps that which cannot be explained away 
by exploitation but is freely entered into, puts sex ‘out there’. It confronts us 
with those baser, more animal aspects of what it is to be human that we would 
rather for the most part were kept hidden. ‘We are bothered by sex because it 
is a fundamentally disruptive, overwhelming and demented force, strongly at 
odds with the majority of our ambitions and all but incapable of being 
discretely integrated within civilised society’, argues de Botton (2013: 5). We 
react to being confronted by the animal sides of our nature by seeking to 
distance ourselves from it and in so doing we merely hide from humanity 
(Nussbaum, 2004). More worryingly, however, we project our unease onto 
others, identifying them as ‘evil’ to our own ‘good’. ‘(P)roperties pertinent to 
the subject’s own fear of animality are projected onto a less powerful group, 
and that group becomes a vehicle for the dominant group’s anxiety about 
itself’ (Nussbaum, 2004: 336). The internet sex offender, in this sense, has 
become a trope for individual and societal anxieties about sex. And, of course, 
such disgust has been institutionalised in law, consequences of which include 
disproportionate legal responses. 
 
New Labour New moralising 
Current dominant expressions of feminism bear strong resonances with the 
political agenda around questions of public morality, which was a hallmark of 
politics in the UK following the election of a New Labour government in 1997. 
Butler and Drakeford (2001) argue that New Labour brought an explicit moral 
(or moralising) agenda to politics, betraying what has been described as an 
impulse ‘to micromanage people’s lives and to intrude the law into spheres 
generally marked out as private in a liberal polity’ (Petley, 2009: 430). This 
tendency was played out in a legal arena in England and Wales in the 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, which sought to criminalise and 
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regulate extreme pornography, defined as acts that were likely to be life-
threatening or injurious to a person’s genitals or involved acts of bestiality but 
also, tellingly, that such depictions be deemed ‘grossly offensive, disgusting or 
otherwise of an obscene character’ (Johnson, 2010: 148). In this latter case, 
the legislation shifts the discourse beyond that of harm towards moral 
evaluation. In this sense, the government explicitly appropriated radical 
feminist perspectives, contending that ‘extreme pornography’ and prostitution 
cause harm and are gendered, involving men’s violence to, and exploitation 
of, women. The government’s intention was to ‘reduce the demand for such 
material and to send a clear message that it has no place in our society’ 
(Home Office, 2008: i). 
 
Having been seriously criticised in an initial consultation over the illiberal 
implications of this legislation, the government commissioned a Rapid 
Evidence Assessment (REA) to make a case for the linkage between 
pornography and harm (Itzin et al., 2007). The report of the REA gave the 
government the ‘evidence’ it required to bolster its case. Carline (2011) 
describes the quality of this evidence as risible, relying on ‘largely discredited’ 
research divorced from the British context and conducted before the internet 
was even widely available. She argues that the Labour Government used the 
vulnerability of women to promote an explicitly moral agenda, writing: 
‘It is disconcerting that the Government argued a need to restrict 
consensual adult sexual activity but failed to adequately substantiate 
this contention. Moreover, it was unethical to argue that the reforms 
were necessary to prevent violence to women when the evidence 
suggests that such results are unlikely’ (2011: 324).  
 
Political incursions into debates on pornography betray a neoconservative 
impulse that finds common cause with the demands of the religious right. It is 
instructive to note the influence of fundamentalist Christian groupings such as 
Premier Christian Media and Safer Media for a Safer Society in campaigns to 
restrict internet access. Neoconservatism and radical feminism come together 
in common cause on this issue if, arguably, from different standpoints. Their 
positions fail to acknowledge the diverse array of sexualities, including the 
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gay, lesbian and queer sexualities that are expressed through pornography. 
Politicians, across party lines, thus use a justification of harm to defend a 
position that is rooted in unreflective moralising and in what they imagine 
(erroneously, if the usage figures are to be believed) to be populist impulses 
towards censorship. This position serves to stick political discourse on this 
matter in what feels like a strangely old-fashioned and unenlightened place. 
 
Social work and pornography 
 
Most social work discussion of pornography up to now has been located 
within the arenas of violence against women and child protection, both of 
which have been influenced by particular feminist perspectives. The 
profession’s allegiance to feminism has generally been closer to radical 
feminisms than to liberal or postmodern feminisms. For example, Mullender 
(2002) lists pornography alongside physical, sexual and emotional abuse and 
the abuse of women within relationships as issues that demand attention in 
social work policy and theorising. This has become a powerful default 
position, which can lead social workers to assume without question that 
pornography (and sex work more generally) is abusive and harmful, rather 
than something people might not only choose to engage in, but may even 
have a right to.  Locating social work’s responses to pornography within such 
a narrow interpretation of feminism actually diminishes the rich body of 
feminist thought that exists beyond the ‘second wave’ (Orme, 2003). Such 
dominant views of pornography impose a powerful normalising voice. While 
claiming to speak for ‘women’, they simultaneously silence the voices of those 
who are involved in pornography. This same tendency was (and is) apparent 
in previous (and current) campaigns against prostitution. Writing about 
nineteenth century social purity campaigners, Sloan and Whab assert: 
‘The religious reformers’ approach to prostitution excluded the voices 
and perspectives of prostitutes and thus obscured the possibility that 
women were not victims and that women might exercise agency in 
choosing to engage in sex work’ (2000: 458).  
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One result of this is that ‘those women who consider the sex industry to be 
legitimate are in the very least silenced or, more problematically, censured for 
being irresponsible and thus potentially damaging the women’s movement’ 
(McClintock, 1993: 7). 
 
Widening the ethical lens 
 
Reviewing the arguments so far, we conclude that (contrary to our own more 
general ethical inclinations which would acknowledge the limitations of 
liberalism), a classical liberal position should remain the bedrock for social 
work’s response to pornography. Both justifications for censorship, harm and 
obscenity, have been found to be problematic. While there may be instances 
of individual harm (and that fact alone might legitimately prompt one to reach 
decisions to refrain from pornography use), the case for specifically gendered 
or wider societal harm is increasingly difficult to sustain; in fact, the available 
data, if anything, points in another direction.  
 
A liberal position would also, we believe, be consistent with social work codes 
of ethics or practice. Under the heading ‘Respecting the right to self-
determination’ the International Federation of Social Workers Statement of 
Ethical Principles (2012) says that ‘Social workers should respect and 
promote people’s right to make their own choices and decisions, irrespective 
of their values and life choices, provided this does not threaten the rights and 
legitimate interests of others’. Such statements may merely highlight the 
limitations of existing codes, reflecting as they do an uneasy mix of liberal 
individualism and utilitarianism. Nevertheless, as they stand, one would be 
entitled to wonder on what grounds social workers might object to 
pornography use.  
 
While we argue that pornography, or at least adult pornography,  should not 
be censored, it does not follow that it is morally unproblematic. However, 
arguments against its use require a widening of the lens through which social 
work approaches the subject, beyond dominant assumptions of harm and 
exploitation, not least because of Adler’s observation that ‘In the escalating 
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war against pornography, pornography has already won’. (2008: 1). Social 
work needs to learn to live with this reality and to do so in ways that preserve 
an ethical rather than a moralising, crusading or pathologising concern at its 
heart. And there may be particular ethical considerations that social workers 
might consider in coming to a position on pornography. 
 
Whan (1986), for instance, argues that social work ought to be oriented to an 
Aristotelian ideal of the good or flourishing life. In this regard, it might be 
argued that some pornography (or maybe erotica) could be argued to be 
affirming of human sexuality. However, it becomes difficult to align what is 
offered on the various ‘adult’ channels that form part of the most basic TV 
package or what is available in any cursory glance at the internet to any 
conception of the good. Sites that seem to promote rape (see McGlynn and 
Ward, 2009) offend against what might be thought to be good or affirming of 
the better angels of our nature. It becomes difficult to reconcile the use of 
such material with the Aristotelian idea of the virtuous person. But, once 
again, the absence of a strong argument indicating harm resulting from such 
availability makes it difficult to justify its proscription. 
 
Ultimately, moral positions on pornography perhaps need to come down to a 
personalised morality rather than recourse to imposed moral codes or 
moralising political initiatives. Beilharz, following Bauman however, argues 
that the prospect of moral autonomy can prove too much for some; ‘morality 
or conventionalism is substituted for ethics … and in turn moralizing or 
hectoring replaces morality, or else morality gives way to law: we let the 
magistrates and black letter law books tell us how to live (2000: 123). The 
current political climate in relation to pornography seems intent on handing 
sexual matters that in most cases really ought to come down to personal 
choice over to the magistrates and to black letter law.  
 
It could be argued that social work has often found it easier to follow the rules 
and to side with the forces of approved morality on questions of sex than to 
properly engage with its ethical complexities. Its track record in this regard is 
not particularly good; a persistent strand in its makeup seems to lead it to 
1
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police the sexualities of those it works with. Its roots are closely linked to the 
Victorian sexual purity movement (Cree, 1995). Throughout much of its 
history it considered homosexuality to be aberrant (McLaughlin, 2010). In the 
late 1980s it was complicit in fuelling subsequently discredited satanic ritual 
abuse panics (Clapton, 1993). Issues around sex in the profession too often 
become ‘obscured by emotion, rhetoric and claims for truth’. (Myers, 2008: 
203). We should take care that current attitudes towards pornography do not 
merely replicate previous episodes in social work’s history; the same fears 
and moralising and the same impulse towards a ‘rescue mode’ risk being 
played out online. The implication of this, as in previous incarnations of the 
rescue mentality, is that the problems faced by children and families become 
reduced to questions of moralising or taste and cease to be matters of 
poverty, overcrowding, unemployment, benefits cuts and the host of very real 
structural issues that blight their lives.  
 
Implications for practice 
 
Pornography is one of those subjects that might serve as something of a 
weather vein, pointing to the role that social work might play in society. It 
seems to us that there are perhaps three possible directions it might take. 
Firstly, social workers might adopt a stance opposed to pornography. For 
many, this will be a legitimate position reflecting strongly held personal views 
about human dignity, the nature of sexual expression or lingering concerns 
around the possibility of exploitation or harm. While each of these rationales is 
undoubtedly valid at a personal level, if institutionalized, this approach runs 
the risk of siding social work with the forces of approved sexual morality. And, 
as pornography becomes increasingly pathologised and appropriated within 
metanarratives of protection the risk is that the profession becomes ever more 
‘annexed to the central police task’ (Garrett, 2004: 90).  
 
An alternative position might be to accept the diversity of human sexuality and 
to assert the potential of pornography to offer alternative expressions of 
sexuality that challenge the normative and conventional. From this 
perspective, social workers might wish to align themselves with service user 
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groups that support sex workers; at very least, they should listen with respect 
to their voices, rather than impose a received moral standpoint. 
 
An third position might be a more agnostic one, acknowledging the free 
choice of consenting adults to engage in pornography, irrespective of one’s 
personal views on the matter, a simple case of asserting Ronald Dworkin’s 
argument that people should be free to make what others might consider to 
be the wrong choices. This might actually free up social workers to focus on 
the ‘social’ aspects of their role and to address structural constraints on their 
clients’ lives, which become marginalised when the profession is waylaid by a 
societal obsession with sex and sex abuse .  
 
Whatever position social workers take they need to realise that this is a 
deeply moralised subject where truth-claims need to be opened to scrutiny 
(Myers, 2008). Specifically, assumptions around the linkage between 
pornography use and contact sexual offending need to be exposed to the cold 
light of evidence. To take this argument further, the profession might have a 
role in asking just what it is that men (invariably) are being prosecuted for. 
This might follow though to asking questions about current assumptions of 
risk and risk assessment and focusing a sceptical gaze on assessments 
made by others, including the police and psychologists.  
 
We conclude by reprising Feder-Kittay’s argument that in debates around 
pornography ‘we require not less speech but more speech’ (1988: 129). 
Specifically, it is important to recognise that there is a variety of experiences 
of pornography and that not all of these are exploitative or damaging. Indeed, 
most, it would seem, are freely entered into. We cannot turn back the tide on 
this reality. Rather, social work needs to hear and validate the range of voices 
of those who might be involved in pornography at whatever level. It may also 
consider a wider role in challenging the forces of illiberalism that are being 
unleashed in the current political climate, where arguments of harm and 
vulnerability are employed, illegitimately, we would argue, to impose a 
particular sexual and moral order. 
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